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WHO HAS STANDING TO SUE THE PRESIDENT 
OVER ALLEGEDLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
EMOLUMENTS? 
MATTHEW HALL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two provisions of the U.S. Constitution that have received 
comparatively little public attention over the past 227 years are suddenly 
all over the news, having provided the basis for three pending lawsuits 
against the president of the United States. The Foreign and Domestic 
Emoluments Clauses arose out of the Founders’ concern with corruption – 
in particular with the corrupting effects of gifts, payments, or benefits 
conferred on federal office holders either by foreign governments or their 
agents, or by any of the states constituting the United States.1 The founders 
viewed the risk of corruption stemming from such payments as so serious 
that they included in the text of the Constitution itself two clauses 
prohibiting the receipt of such benefits. The Foreign Emoluments Clause 
prohibits the receipt of gifts or other benefits from any foreign power, by 
any officer of the United States, without Congress’s express consent.2 The 
Domestic Emoluments Clause provides that the president’s salary shall 
remain fixed during his term, and that the president cannot receive any 
emolument other than his statutory salary, from any state government or 
any part of the federal government, during his term of office.3  
The question the three new lawsuits raise is whether President Trump’s 
continued ownership of a business empire that receives significant—and 
growing—payments from foreign government entities violates the Foreign 
                                                
* Associate Professor, The University of Georgia School of Law. I benefitted greatly from 
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft by Kent Barnett, Nathan Chapman, and Jonathan Remy Nash, 
and from comments received during a faculty colloquium at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge 
School of Law. Thanks as well to T.J. Striepe and the UGA Law Library staff for their help. 
1.  For an extensive discussion of the history of the emoluments clauses, including the 
Founders’ concern with meddling by foreign powers in the domestic affairs of the United States, see 
NORMAN EISEN ET AL., THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO 
DONALD J. TRUMP 3–4 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_e 
moluments-clause1.pdf. See also ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW 
MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-
Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).  
2.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under 
them [i.e., the United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, 
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”).  
3.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.  
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Emoluments Clause.4 Each of the pending lawsuits asks a federal court to 
declare that the president’s continued ownership of his businesses—
together with the receipt of foreign government funds by those businesses 
without Congress’s consent—violates the Foreign Emoluments Clause.5 
They thus ask the courts either to order the president to divest ownership 
of his businesses, or to enjoin those businesses from accepting foreign 
emoluments without Congress’s consent, so long as the president retains 
his ownership stake. Two of the pending actions also assert that the 
president is unlawfully receiving domestic emoluments through his 
businesses, in the form of direct payments to, and waiver of zoning, 
environmental, or other legal requirements for, Trump Organization 
enterprises, and ask the courts to enjoin the president from accepting those 
emoluments as well.  
The pending actions raise interesting and important merits questions in 
a little-discussed area of constitutional law.6 But before a federal court can 
                                                
4. Jonathan O'Connell & Mary Jordan, For Foreign Diplomats, Trump Hotel Is Place To Be, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/2016/11 
/18/9da9c572-ad18-11e6-977a-1030f822fc35_story.html?utm_term=.3871136334d4 (quoting foreign 
diplomats announcing intention to shift business to Trump International Hotel); Jackie Northam, 
Kuwait Celebration at Trump Hotel Raises Conflict of Interest Questions, NPR (Feb. 25, 2017, 6:33 
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/25/ 517039323/kuwait-celebration-at-trump-
hotel-raises-conflict-of-interest-questions. In the first four months of 2017, profits at the Trump 
International D.C. were over $4 million higher than the Trump Organization’s projections, owing in 
part to room rates that averaged $652 per night—fifty-seven percent higher than projected. See 
Jonathan O’Connell, Trump D.C. Hotel Turns $2 Million Profit in Four Months, WASH. POST (Aug. 
10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-dc-hotel-turns-2-million-profit-in-four-
months/2017/08/10/23bd97f0-7e02-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.6331cf71901a 
(noting that the Trump Organization projected a $2 million loss for first four months of 2017, but 
instead “is already turning a hefty profit,” driven by “the extraordinary prices guests have been willing 
to pay for rooms . . .”). 
5.  The first lawsuit was filed in January 2017 by Citizens for Ethics and Responsibility in 
Washington (“CREW”), and subsequently amended to include three additional plaintiffs—two 
individuals and a restaurant industry association, all of whom allege that they compete with Trump 
Organization properties for diplomatic and other foreign government business. See Second Amended 
Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y. 
filed May 10, 2017) [hereinafter “CREW Complaint”]. The second lawsuit was filed June 12, 2017 by 
the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia. Complaint, D.C. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-01596-PJM 
at 1–4 (D. Md. filed June 12, 2017) [hereinafter “State Complaint”]. The third lawsuit was filed on 
June 14, 2017, by 196 Democratic members of Congress. Complaint, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-
cv-01154 (D.D.C. filed June 14, 2017) [hereinafter “Blumenthal Complaint”].  
6.  The merits questions have been well-addressed by Michael Dorf, Marty Lederman, and 
others. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Trump Emoluments Argument Mirrors His “Just a Hope” Comey 
Defense, TAKE CARE (June 14, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/trump-emoluments-argument-
mirrors-his-just-a-hope-comey-defense; Marty Lederman, How the DOJ Brief in CREW v. Trump 
Reveals that Donald Trump Is Violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause, TAKE CARE (June 12, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/how-the-doj-brief-in-crew-v-trump-reveals-that-donald-trump-is-
violating-the-foreign-emoluments-clause; EISEN ET AL., supra note 1. For arguments that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause should be interpreted narrowly, see, e.g., Andy Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments 
Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Seth Barrett Tillman, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/6
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reach those questions, it must first address the threshold question of 
whether the plaintiffs that initiated these lawsuits are proper parties to 
raise these claims—whether, that is, they have Article III standing. The 
Supreme Court has never had occasion to address the question of who may 
enforce the emoluments clauses.7 It has not come up, because most 
presidents have had relatively simple asset portfolios, and, in recent 
decades, because all presidents have employed blind trusts or other 
mechanisms to ensure that their decisions as president could not be 
influenced by the possible impact on their own investments.8 But President 
Trump has departed from those practices, and the standing questions now 
require resolution. The plaintiffs’ claims and personal stakes in these 
matters differ in significant ways, but the Court’s jurisprudence on 
competitor standing, state standing, and legislative standing dictates that 
the plaintiffs in each action have alleged sufficient facts to establish 
Article III standing.  
I. COMPETITOR STANDING IN CREW V. TRUMP 
The first of the three pending emoluments actions was filed on 
President Trump’s first full day in office, January 24, 2017, by the 
nonprofit organization Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington (CREW). It was later amended to add claims by two 
individual plaintiffs—Eric Goode and Jill Phaneuf—and a restaurant 
                                                                                                           
Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
759 (2017).  
7.  For recent scholarly work on the justiciability of Emoluments Clause claims, see, e.g., 
Brianne J. Gorod, Congressional Standing Is Not an All-or-Nothing Proposition, TAKE CARE (June 19, 
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/congressional-standing-is-not-an-all-or-nothing-proposition; 
Zachary Clopton, Emoluments And Justiciability, TAKE CARE (June 26, 2017) https://takecareblog. 
com/blog/emoluments-and-justiciability; Eric Segall, Members of Congress Have Standing In The 
Emoluments Suit, TAKE CARE (June 24, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/members-of-congress-
have-standing-in-the-emoluments-suit; Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, Maryland and DC Have 
Standing to Sue Trump for Emoluments Violations, TAKE CARE (June 12, 2017), https://takecareblog.c 
om/blog/maryland-and-dc-have-standing-to-sue-trump-for-emoluments-violations; G. Michael 
Parsons, Raines Check: Legislator Standing and the Separation of Powers, TAKE CARE (July 10, 
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/raines-check-legislator-standing-and-the-separation-of-powers. 
8.  See Cynthia Brown & L. Paige Whitaker, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST AND THE PRESIDENCY 2 (2016) (“Historical practice illustrates a relatively longstanding 
precedent of Presidents—including Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. 
Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush—who have voluntarily ‘divested’ their assets.”); Editorial, 
Donald Trump’s Tangled Web, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/1 
7/opinion/what-trump-can-do-to-eliminate-his-conflicts-of-interest.html (“When Jimmy Carter became 
president, he put his relatively simple businesses—a peanut farm and warehouse—into a trust that 
gave an independent trustee the discretion to sell the warehouse and to rent out the farm without Mr. 
Carter’s approval.”); Ronald Reagan, Announcement of the Formation of a Blind Trust To Manage the 
President's Personal Assets (Jan. 30, 1981), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44168.  
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industry organization, Restaurant Opportunities Council, Inc. (ROC). 
Plaintiffs in the CREW action allege that the president has violated the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause by accepting, without the consent of 
Congress, various emoluments—in particular, profits from the use of 
Trump Organization hotels and restaurants by foreign officials. Plaintiffs 
seek two forms of relief: a declaratory judgment that President Trump’s 
acceptance of these benefits without congressional consent “violates or 
will violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause,” and an injunction ordering 
Trump to refrain “from violating the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments 
Clauses.”9 
Plaintiffs allege that the Founders saw the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
as necessary to protect every American’s interest in avoiding official 
corruption. But that widely-shared interest alone would not support Article 
III standing, because it is a “generalized grievance” that afflicts the 
plaintiffs no more than every other American.10 Mere allegations that the 
defendant has violated the law do not suffice to establish standing to sue. 
Rather, in seeking to establish Article III standing, the plaintiffs must 
allege that they “personally [have] suffered some actual or threatened 
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,” and 
that the requested relief would likely redress their injuries.11  
The two individual plaintiffs and ROC allege standing under a 
“competitor standing” theory, and rely on a long line of Supreme Court 
cases holding that market participants have standing to challenge 
government action that gives their competitors an advantage in the 
marketplace. The Court “routinely recognizes probable economic injury 
resulting from [defendants’ actions] that alter competitive conditions as 
sufficient to satisfy the [Article III ‘injury-in-fact’ requirement].”12 And 
where the altered competitive conditions were caused by the defendant’s 
conduct, and could be eliminated by a favorable court decision, the 
                                                
9.         CREW Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 269 et seq.  
10.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (noting that a plaintiff’s alleged injury that involves nothing more than “harm to 
his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws” generally is 
insufficient to support standing); id. at 577 (noting that if the Court were to “convert the 
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ 
vindicable in the courts . . . [it would] transfer from the [p]resident to the courts the Chief Executive’s 
most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”). 
11.  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979)). 
12.  Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 433 (1998) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS & 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 13–14 (3d ed. 1994); see also Ass’n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (“[t]here can be no doubt but that 
petitioners have satisfied [Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement]” where they allege potential loss of 
profits and loss of customers to competitor). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/6
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causation and redressability elements of standing are satisfied as well.13 
Thus, a plaintiff’s business that faces a more difficult competitive 
environment due to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful actions has 
standing to challenge those actions.14  
The individual plaintiffs and ROC easily satisfy the requirements for 
standing under this line of Supreme Court cases. Plaintiff Eric Goode 
alleges that he owns and operates several high-end hotels and restaurants 
in New York City, and that he competes with Trump properties for 
diplomatic and other foreign government business.15 Plaintiff Jill Phaneuf 
alleges that she works as a hospitality booker for two luxury hotels in 
Washington D.C., and that her job includes booking “embassy functions 
and political functions involving foreign governments” and “functions for 
organizations that are connected to foreign governments.”16 She also 
alleges that her compensation is directly related to the number and size of 
bookings that she makes, such that if her hotels lose business to Trump 
hotels her compensation will be reduced.17 Plaintiff ROC alleges that it 
operates several restaurants in Washington, D.C. that compete with Trump 
properties for foreign government business.18  
In sum, the plaintiffs each allege all the requisites of a competitor 
standing theory: that they compete with President Trump’s hotels and 
restaurants for diplomatic and other foreign government business “by 
providing the same or similar service in the same marketplace,”19 and that 
his unlawful acceptance of foreign government business has altered the 
competitive landscape by creating an incentive for foreign governments 
and their agents to shift business to Trump Organization properties, 
thereby depriving plaintiffs of the opportunity to compete for that business 
on a level playing field. The Plaintiffs’ allegations are not merely 
speculative: they allege facts showing that foreign states have already 
                                                
13.  Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736–37 (2016); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 
S. Ct. 1540, 1547–50 (2016); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1386–88 (2014). 
14.  See, e.g., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 482 
n.4 (1998); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 621 (1971) (noting that “[t]here can be no real 
question” of petitioner’s standing to challenge a government action that exposed them to increased 
competition); Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (in a different context, 
finding Article III injury because of a bar to compete on a level playing field and finding causation and 
redressability satisfied where Court order could level the playing field). 
15.  See CREW Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 15, 221, 228–34. 
16.  Id. ¶ 15. 
17.  Id.  ¶¶ 16–17, 221–227 Phaneuf also alleges that the Trump International Hotel hired an 
employee with responsibilities similar to hers after the election—an employee, that is, whose very job 
is to secure bookings with foreign states and officers thereof. 
18.  Id. ¶¶ 192, 198, 212, 220. 
19.  Id. ¶¶ 196, 223, 231. See also id. ¶¶ 15–17, 61, 221–227. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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shifted business to President Trump’s hotels and restaurants from 
competing hotels and restaurants, including those owned and operated by 
the plaintiffs.20 Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to satisfy Article III 
standing. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of President Trump, 
moved to dismiss CREW’s Complaint on June 9, 2017, arguing that the 
plaintiffs lack standing. The DOJ brief argues that Goode and Phaneuf’s 
asserted competitive injuries depend on speculation about how third 
parties not before the Court—namely, foreign governments and their 
agents—will allocate their hotel and restaurant spending.21 But this 
misreads the competitor standing case law. The Court has held that the 
intervening cause of potential customers’ choices is no bar to standing in 
competitor standing cases.22 The altered competitive landscape alone is a 
sufficient injury to support standing because when the competitive 
environment is altered to favor a particular business, that conduct “almost 
surely injures” competing businesses “in one form or another.”23  
Discovery and perhaps summary judgment practice will reveal the 
extent to which the individual plaintiffs can back up their various 
allegations with evidence. However, at the motion to dismiss stage, 
plaintiffs’ allegations must be taken as true,24 and plaintiffs have 
sufficiently alleged facts that, if proved, would establish injury, causation, 
                                                
20.  Id. ¶¶ 15–19, 192 (alleging that “[a]s a direct result of [President Trump’s] refusal to avoid 
. . . violations of the Emoluments Clauses,” plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer injury 
to their business due to loss of revenue from foreign government business, unless the court grants the 
relief sought). 
21.  See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19, Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00458-RA (S.D.N.Y. filed June 9, 2017) 
[hereinafter “DOJ Motion To Dismiss”] (arguing that the alleged injuries are “conjectural” because 
“[u]ncontrollable and unpredictable decisions by third parties are . . . a necessary part of any claim that 
Phaneuf and Goode will suffer any injuries in their hotel or hotel-events businesses”).  
22.  See, e.g., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 482–83; 
see also Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280–81 (finding plaintiffs competitive injury 
redressable where the Court could eliminate plaintiff’s competitive disadvantage).  
23.  See Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
The form of [alleged competitive] injury may vary; for example, a seller facing increased 
competition may lose sales to rivals, or be forced to lower its price or to expend more 
resources to achieve the same sales, all to the detriment of its bottom line. Because increased 
competition almost surely injures a seller in one form or another, he need not wait until 
“allegedly illegal transactions . . . hurt [him] competitively” before challenging the regulatory 
(or, for that matter, the deregulatory) governmental decision that increases competition.  
Id. 
24.  Defendant’s motion to dismiss contests whether Plaintiffs’ properties in fact compete with 
the Defendant’s properties, in part because his hotels and restaurants are allegedly better than theirs. 
See DOJ Motion To Dismiss, supra note 21, at 17. But such factual disputes cannot be resolved at the 
12(b)(1) stage, and in light of plaintiffs’ expert declarations, they are unlikely to be resolved in 
Defendant’s favor at the summary judgment stage. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/6
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and redressability with respect to the president’s acceptance of bookings 
by foreign governments and their agents at Trump Organization hotels and 
restaurants.25 
II. STATE STANDING 
Maryland and the District of Columbia sued President Trump on June 
12, 2017, alleging that he is violating both the Foreign and Domestic 
Emoluments Clauses, and seeking a judicial declaration to that effect, as 
well as an order enjoining further violations. The state plaintiffs’ 
complaint presents several independent bases for standing, all but one of 
which would appear to be sufficient under Supreme Court precedent. 
A. Foreign Emoluments Clause 
The state plaintiffs allege that they have been, and will continue to be, 
injured by the president’s violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
both in their sovereign capacities and their proprietary capacities. The 
doctrine regarding state standing to sue in federal court follows broadly 
similar lines to individual standing: states must show an injury, as well as 
causation and redressability.26 But the Court has long “recognized that 
States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal 
jurisdiction”27 and are “entitled to special solicitude in our standing 
analysis.”28 States may sue to protect either their sovereign interests, such 
as their interest in enforcing a state law or collecting tax revenue, or their 
proprietary interests, such as their interest in property or their contract 
rights.29 The state plaintiffs in D.C. v. Trump assert injuries to both their 
sovereign and proprietary interests.  
                                                
25.  The other plaintiff in the CREW action—CREW itself—alleges standing on the theory that 
the president’s conduct impairs its ability to accomplish its mission by diverting its limited resources 
into monitoring and counteracting the president’s emoluments violations. CREW Complaint, supra 
note 5, ¶ 153. Michael Dorf has argued persuasively that CREW does have organizational standing. 
See Michael Dorf, The Injury in the Emoluments Clause Case, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/01/the-injury-in-emoluments-clause-case.html. As a practical matter, 
however, CREW’s standing may not matter so long as at least one plaintiff in the case has standing to 
seek each form of relief sought. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 
(2017) (reaffirming that Article III is satisfied so long as “[a]t least one plaintiff [has] standing to seek 
each form of relief requested in the complaint”); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) 
(holding that where at least one plaintiff has standing, court may proceed to merits and need not 
determine whether other plaintiffs independently have standing). 
26.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007). 
27.  Id. at 518. 
28.  Id. at 520. 
29.  Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (holding that Puerto 
Rico had standing to challenge private discrimination against its citizens that violated federal law). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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1. Injury to State Sovereign Interests 
Plaintiffs allege that the president’s violations of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause have injured their sovereign interests in multiple 
ways. The clearest case for standing pertains to Maryland’s allegations 
that the president’s acceptance of foreign emoluments reduces business at 
competing hotels and other businesses in Maryland and thereby injures 
Maryland’s sovereign interest in protecting its tax revenues.30 Maryland’s 
allegations of injury parallel the competitor standing allegations of the 
CREW complaint, with the added wrinkle that Maryland’s injury derives 
from competitive harm suffered by any hotels or restaurants within 
Maryland, not only those in which Maryland has an ownership interest. 
Plaintiffs allege that the Trump International Hotel in Washington D.C. 
is a direct competitor of hotels in the state of Maryland, and that those 
Maryland hotels “generate significant tax revenue for state and local 
governments” on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars each year.31 
Plaintiffs further allege that the president’s violations of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause cause “competitive harm” to Maryland hotels by 
“tilt[ing] the competitive playing field toward [Trump’s] businesses; 
caus[ing] competing companies and their employees to lose business, 
wages, and tips; and generat[ing] a range of market distortions that restrict 
and curtail opportunity, diminish revenues and earnings, and hamper 
competition.”32 This incentive for foreign governments to shift business to 
Trump hotels, in turn, diminishes Maryland’s tax revenues.33  
A 1992 Supreme Court case called Wyoming v. Oklahoma clearly 
establishes Maryland’s standing under this theory.34 In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that Wyoming had standing to challenge an 
Oklahoma law that allegedly reduced demand for Wyoming coal, and thus 
reduced the state’s tax revenue.35 Oklahoma’s law required Oklahoma 
utilities to purchase ten percent of their coal from Oklahoma mines. 
Previously, Oklahoma utilities had purchased nearly all of their coal from 
Wyoming. The State of Wyoming challenged the law on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds, arguing that it was injured because the law 
caused a reduction in demand for Wyoming coal and thereby reduced the 
                                                
30.  See State Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 14, 103–09, 116–118. 
31.  State Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 116. This basis for standing is asserted only by Maryland, 
of course. The District of Columbia does not claim injury to its tax revenue from the increased 
business at the Trump hotel in the District. 
32.  Id. ¶¶ 118, 114. 
33.  Id. ¶¶ 117–118. 
34.  502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
35.  Id. at 448. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/6
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state’s severance tax revenue. The Supreme Court held that this injury was 
sufficient to give Wyoming standing.36  
Maryland’s claim against Trump is not meaningfully distinguishable 
from the claims in Wyoming v. Oklahoma. Like Wyoming, Maryland 
seeks to challenge, on constitutional grounds, the action of another 
government entity whose wrongdoing allegedly changed the competitive 
environment to the plaintiff’s detriment. And like Wyoming, Maryland 
seeks to establish the requisite personal stake by alleging a loss of tax 
revenue resulting from a reduction in business for taxpaying entities 
within the plaintiff state. If such a loss of tax revenue gave Wyoming 
standing in that case, it should suffice to give Maryland standing here. 
2. Injury to State Proprietary Interests 
The state plaintiffs also allege injury to their proprietary interests as 
owners and operators of hospitality facilities in the Washington D.C. area 
that compete with Trump properties. Both Maryland and the District of 
Columbia allege that they own and operate multiple event venues that 
“serve[] the diplomatic community and foreign and state governments by 
providing services that compete with those owned or controlled by the 
defendant or the Trump Organization.”37 Plaintiffs also allege detailed 
facts concerning: (1) an increase since the presidential election in events 
held by foreign governments at the Trump International Hotel in 
Washington D.C. and (2) public statements by multiple foreign officials 
that, “since the defendant was elected president, they are more likely to 
pay for goods and services at the defendant’s properties” instead of his 
competitors’ properties.38 The plaintiffs allege therefore that President 
Trump’s “receipt or acceptance of presents or emoluments,” through his 
hotel properties, “has resulted in a competitive injury” to the plaintiffs’ 
competing properties.39  
The plaintiffs’ standing allegations here are nearly identical to the 
competitor standing arguments made by the individual plaintiffs in the 
CREW case, discussed above, and they suffice to establish standing for the 
same reasons. The Supreme Court’s competitive injury cases establish 
that, as proprietors of hospitality businesses that allegedly compete with 
Trump Organization properties, the state plaintiffs have standing on a 
competitor standing theory to challenge any unconstitutional conduct that 
                                                
36.  Id. 
37.  State Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 121, 130–32.  
38.  Id. ¶ 127.  
39.  Id. ¶ 128. 
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injures them by forcing them to compete on a non-level playing field.40  
B. Domestic Emoluments Clause 
The state plaintiffs also assert a claim under the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause, which prohibits the president from receiving “any other 
Emolument [beyond his salary] from the United States, or any of them” 
during his term of office.41 The clause was included in the Constitution to 
guarantee that no part of the federal government, nor any state, could 
either “weaken [the president’s] fortitude by operating on his necessities, 
nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to his avarice.”42 Unlike the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, the Domestic Emoluments Clause is absolute—it 
does not permit Congress to consent to the president’s receipt of any 
domestic emolument. The clause is designed to “[shield] the states and the 
District of Columbia from undue pressure to provide emoluments to the 
[p]resident, and [protect] them from reprisal for any refusal to do so . . . 
[while safeguarding] the states and the District from unfair advantages” 
that other states may enjoy from “opportunities to curry favor from the 
[p]resident by providing emoluments.”43 
The plaintiffs allege that the president has already received emoluments 
from the federal government and from other states, including: payments 
from state governments and subdivisions thereof for the use of Trump 
facilities, investments by state pension funds in Trump Organization 
projects, and governmental benefits including tax credits, and waivers and 
other concessions with respect to environmental, zoning and land use 
protections.44 Plaintiffs allege that these payments and benefits constitute 
prohibited emoluments, and that as a “direct result of these violations of 
the Domestic Emoluments Clause,” the plaintiffs have suffered, and will 
suffer, significant injury.45 In particular, the president’s Domestic 
Emoluments Clause violations allegedly present Maryland and the District 
of Columbia with an intolerable dilemma: 
[E]ither (1) grant the [Trump] Organization’s requests for 
concessions, exemptions, waivers, variances, and the like and suffer 
                                                
40.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
41.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
42.  THE FEDERALIST, NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). 
43.  State Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶  8, 107 (noting Founders’ concern that states or the 
federal government “might seek to buy off the [p]resident so that he would exercise power to their 
advantage and to the detriment of other states, thereby disrupting the balance of power in the federalist 
system”); see also EISEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–5. 
44.  State Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 98–99, 107–09. 
45.  Id. ¶ 142. 
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the consequences . . . including lost revenue and compromised 
enforcement of environmental protection, zoning and land use 
regulations, or (2) deny such requests and be placed at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis states and other government entities that 
have granted or will agree to such concessions.46  
This Hobson’s choice leaves plaintiffs and other states “feeling compelled 
(or being compelled) to confer private financial benefits on the president 
in order to compete for influence and favor” —precisely the sort of injury 
that the Founders sought to prevent when they included the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause in the Constitution.47 
The state plaintiffs’ case for standing is at its weakest on this claim. 
Standing requires that the plaintiffs’ injury be “actual or imminent, not 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”48 Their alleged “governmental interest in 
not being compelled to compete improperly for influence or favor” is not 
supported by any allegation that the Trump Organization has actually 
asked them for any concessions of any kind.49 Thus, they have not (yet) 
been pressured to “compete” with other states for the president’s favor. 
Their assertions of injury appear to depend on future events that may or 
may not occur. Absent allegations of actual or imminent injury, the court 
will likely either deny standing as to the Domestic Emoluments Clause 
claim, or dismiss this claim as unripe.50 If plaintiffs are able to allege, now 
or in the future, facts suggesting that they have actually been asked for 
emoluments, or that there is a substantial risk that they will be, their claim 
of injury would be sufficiently concrete to satisfy Article III standing 
requirements, but the initial Complaint contains no such allegation. 
III. LEGISLATIVE STANDING 
The third Emoluments Clause lawsuit was filed on June 14, 2017 by 
thirty United States Senators and 166 members of the House of 
Representatives.51 The congressional plaintiffs allege similar facts 
concerning President Trump’s acceptance of emoluments as the plaintiffs 
                                                
46.  Id. ¶ 110. 
47.  Id. ¶ 107; see also EISEN ET AL., supra note 1 at 3–5. 
48.  See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). 
49.  State Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 107. 
50.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013); see also Susan B. Anthony 
List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“An allegation of future injury may suffice if the 
threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”). 
51.  See Blumenthal Complaint, supra note 5. The Blumenthal plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint on August 15, 2017, adding five additional members of Congress as plaintiffs. See First 
Amended Complaint, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 15, 2017). 
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in the other pending cases, but they allege a unique injury premised on 
Congress’s constitutionally-prescribed role in reviewing and consenting 
(or not) to federal officers’ receipt of foreign emoluments. In brief, the 
congressional plaintiffs assert that President Trump has injured them by 
nullifying their constitutional role in voting to grant or withhold consent to 
his receipt of foreign emoluments. Under the Supreme Court’s legislative 
standing case law, these allegations provide a compelling basis for 
standing.  
To establish legislative standing to assert an institutional injury, a 
litigant typically must allege the deprivation of a legislative prerogative, 
such as nullification of a vote or deprivation of the opportunity to vote on 
legislative business.52 In Coleman v. Miller, for instance, individual 
legislators alleged a deprivation of their right to have their votes on a 
proposed constitutional amendment counted in accordance with law.53 The 
Court held that such nullification of the plaintiffs’ votes injured them and 
that their “interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes” was 
sufficient to support Article III standing.54 
Similarly, the Court held just two years ago, in Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, that a state 
legislature had standing to challenge a state constitutional amendment that 
shifted authority for drawing congressional districts from the legislature to 
an independent commission. The challenged amendment “strip[ped] the 
Legislature of its alleged prerogative to initiate redistricting,” which, the 
Court held, constituted a judicially cognizable institutional injury 
sufficient to give the legislature standing.55 
                                                
52.  For a comprehensive discussion of legislative standing doctrine, see generally Matthew I. 
Hall, Making Sense of Legislative Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2016). For other recent scholarship 
on legislative standing, see Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1253 (2017) (arguing that legislative standing is inappropriate when Congress possesses legislative 
means of remedying its alleged injury); Tara Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to 
Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014) (arguing that federal legislative standing is 
appropriate only in narrow circumstances); Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914 
(2012) (arguing for greater participation by Congress in litigation over federal laws).  
53.  Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435– 40 (1939). 
54.  Id. at 438; see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 824– 30 (1997) (rejecting legislative 
standing where no legislative prerogative had been eliminated). 
55.  135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2015). See also id. at 2665 (recognizing standing to challenge 
elimination of legislature’s “prerogative to initiate redistricting” where challenged constitutional 
amendment “would ‘completely nullif[y]’ any vote by the Legislature, now or ‘in the future’”); 
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433 (finding standing where legislators’ votes allegedly had been unlawfully 
disregarded); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (recognizing Congress’ standing to defend a 
legislative prerogative); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated on other 
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (finding standing where president’s unilateral action “deprived each 
individual Senator of his alleged right to cast a vote” on whether to terminate a treaty) (emphasis 
added). 
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The injuries alleged in Blumenthal v. Trump closely resemble those that 
supported legislative standing in Coleman and Arizona State Legislature. 
The congressional plaintiffs allege that, by failing to present proposed 
emoluments to Congress for consent, the president has deprived them of 
an individual legislative prerogative: the right to cast a vote on whether 
President Trump may accept a particular emolument before he accepts it.56 
Under the plain text of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, any federal 
officer wishing to accept a foreign emolument must first petition Congress 
for consent, and each member of Congress is entitled to cast a vote on 
whether to grant consent.57 As in Coleman, where each member of the 
state Senate was entitled to have his or her vote properly counted, here, 
each plaintiff member of Congress alleges an individual right to receive 
information concerning proposed emoluments, and to deliberate, debate, 
and vote on whether to permit the president to accept them.58 The 
president’s failure to disclose his proposed emoluments to Congress, 
together with his acceptance of them without Congress’s consent, 
completely eliminates that prerogative. Moreover, it effectively transfers 
to the president Congress’s role as initial decision maker with respect to 
proposed emoluments. Such a transfer of legislative authority to another 
governmental actor is the one circumstance in which the Court has 
repeatedly permitted legislative standing.59 
This elimination of Congress’s power, and of the individual members’ 
power to consider and vote on proposed emoluments, make the claims in 
Blumenthal appear far closer to Coleman and Arizona State Legislature 
than to cases in which the Court has denied legislative standing, such as 
Raines v. Byrd.60 In Raines, individual members of Congress challenged 
the Line Item Veto Act on the ground that it impermissibly transferred 
legislative power to the president. The Court first discussed Coleman, and 
reaffirmed its holding that individual legislators have standing to sue 
executive officials if their votes “have been completely nullified.”61 The 
Court then held that plaintiffs lacked legislative standing because they had 
                                                
56.  Blumenthal Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 71– 77. 
57. Members of the House and Senate have an individual right to vote on matters coming 
before those bodies. See U.S. Const. art I. § 3, cl. 1 (“each Senator shall have one Vote”); id. art I. § 5, 
cl. 3 (requiring the House and Senate to record “the Yeas and Nays of the Members” upon request of 
one-fifth of those present).  
58.  Cf. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (noting that the power to legislate 
entails the power to gather necessary information from those who possess it). 
59.  See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663 (finding legislative standing to challenge 
transfer of legislative power to another governmental actor); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433 (finding 
legislative standing to challenge exercise by the executive of a power allegedly reserved to legislators). 
60.  521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
61.  Id. at 823. 
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not been deprived of their opportunity to vote, now or in the future. Their 
votes against the Line Item Veto Act had been given full effect; the 
plaintiffs simply were outvoted by their colleagues when the Line Item 
Veto Act was enacted. Furthermore, the Court noted that the plaintiffs 
retained all of their legislative authority: Congress could simply exempt 
future laws from the Line Item Veto Act’s coverage, and thereby redress 
its own alleged injury using the ordinary tools of the legislative process. 
The Court acknowledged that ignoring past votes and denying the 
opportunity to vote are both cognizable injuries, but held that neither harm 
had befallen the Raines plaintiffs. No vote had been nullified, nor any 
legislative power eliminated.62 
Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs allege that the president’s failure to 
come to Congress seeking consent, or even to disclose the emoluments he 
accepts, has denied them any opportunity to vote on whether or not to 
consent. These allegations fall squarely within  Supreme Court and D.C. 
Circuit precedent holding that legislators have a legally cognizable interest 
in preserving the effectiveness of their votes that is injured when they are 
deprived of the opportunity to vote.63  
Unlike Raines, there is no effective legislative remedy for this alleged 
injury. First, the president has allegedly failed to disclose his foreign 
emoluments to Congress—and the plaintiffs cannot vote on emoluments 
they do not know about.64 And second, even if the plaintiffs were aware of 
a particular emolument, the president’s alleged practice of accepting 
emoluments without consent has eliminated entirely Congress’ power to 
decline consent by simple inaction. By requiring congressional consent 
before the president may accept an emolument, the Constitution gives 
Congress a robust power to reject a proposed emolument without 
mustering any particular number of votes; if either chamber simply fails to 
act on a proposed emolument, consent is denied. Thus, the Clause gives 
Congress a unilateral power to reject emoluments that it can exercise 
merely by not acting. The president’s actions, as alleged in the Blumenthal 
complaint, have entirely eliminated that power. As things stand now, the 
only legislative power that Congress retains with respect to emoluments 
that have already been accepted by the president, is to affirmatively enact 
a law expressly denying consent—presumably by a veto-proof, two-thirds 
                                                
62.  Id. at 824, 830 n.11; see also Segall, supra note 7. 
63. See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663; Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 
(D.C. Cir 1979), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
64.  Blumenthal Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 77 (alleging that the president’s refusal “to seek 
Plaintiffs’ consent as constitutionally required” has completely deprived the plaintiffs of the 
“opportunity to cast a binding vote . . . in the sense that they have no legislative power to exercise an 
equivalent voting opportunity”). 
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majority in each chamber—or else to impeach. Either course of action 
requires a supermajority, and neither would give the plaintiffs what the 
Constitution entitles them to: the right to decide whether defendant may 
accept an emolument before he does so, and the power to deny such 
consent without taking any affirmative legislative action.  
Thus, the president’s conduct has injured the plaintiff members of 
Congress in three distinct ways. First, the plaintiffs have been deprived 
entirely of the opportunity to cast effective votes on whether to consent to 
proposed emoluments before those emoluments are accepted.65 Unlike the 
“abstract dilution of legislative power” at issue in Raines, the injury 
alleged here concerns a specific legislative prerogative belonging to each 
individual member. Second, the president’s alleged conduct has altered the 
significance of votes that the plaintiff members of Congress may cast in 
the future concerning emoluments.66 By allegedly accepting emoluments 
without congressional consent, the president has made it impossible for 
Congress to block an emolument without a two-thirds vote of each 
chamber, and thereby reduced the effectiveness of each individual 
member’s vote. And third, by accepting emoluments without 
congressional consent, the president has eliminated the power of 
individual members of Congress to delay or defeat bills that would grant 
consent. In both the House and the Senate, individual members have 
substantial power to delay proposed legislation, which is why it is—as 
President Kennedy famously noted—much more difficult to pass a bill in 
Congress than to defeat one.67 Moreover, Senate rules give each individual 
Senator the power to filibuster proposed legislation. Thus, a single 
Senator, if sufficiently determined, can prevent a matter from coming to a 
vote at all.68  
In sum, the president’s conduct has eliminated not only Congress’ role 
as first mover in the emoluments process, but also the individual plaintiffs’ 
                                                
65.  See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663– 65; Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435– 40. 
66.  See Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665. 
67.  See Interview by William H. Lawrence et al. with John F. Kennedy, President of the U.S. 
(Dec. 17, 1962), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9060. 
It is very easy to defeat a bill in the Congress. It is much more difficult to pass one. To go 
through a . . . subcommittee and get a majority vote, the full committee and get a majority 
vote, go to the Rules Committee and get a rule, go to the Floor of the House and get a 
majority, start over again in the Senate, subcommittee and full committee, and in the Senate 
there is unlimited debate, so you can never bring a matter to a vote if there is enough 
determination on the part of the opponents, even if they are a minority, to go through the 
Senate with the bill . . . . [T]hat is an extremely difficult task.” 
Id. 
68.  See id. (“[I]n the Senate there is unlimited debate, so you can never bring a matter to a vote 
if there is enough determination on the part of the opponents, even if they are a minority.”). 
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authority to cast binding votes on proposed emoluments before they are 
accepted. It has also, in the case of the plaintiff senators, nullified their 
power to filibuster bills that would grant consent to particular 
emoluments.69 
Some scholars have recently argued that the claims asserted by the 
congressional plaintiffs belong to Congress, not to individual members, 
and thus that only a majority vote by the full House and Senate could 
invoke legislative standing to assert these claims.70 This view is based on a 
misunderstanding of the case law. First, the Court has never held that 
legislative standing requires the entire chamber to authorize a suit, and 
indeed, Coleman forecloses such a holding with respect to a claim that a 
legislator’s right to cast a binding vote has been denied.71  
Second, this argument misunderstands Raines v. Byrd. The Raines 
court said that it placed “some importance” on the fact that neither House 
of Congress had authorized the lawsuit – and indeed, that both chambers 
opposed the suit.72 That mattered in Raines, because the Court 
characterized the injury alleged as the “abstract dilution of [Congress’s] 
legislative power” and not as a particularized harm to any individual 
                                                
69.  See, e.g., Senate Legislative Process, SENATE.GOV (last visited Sept. 16, 2017), 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm (noting that by 
Senate tradition, any Senator can place a hold on any piece of legislation and prevent it from coming to 
a vote and also has the right of filibuster on any proposed legislation); see also Grove & Devins, supra 
note 52 at 606– 07 (“there is no question that individual Senators have considerable power to obstruct 
action within the chamber”). 
70.  Professor Andy Grewal, for instance, has argued that the plaintiffs in Blumenthal are 
“individual legislators who don’t have any individual injuries, [so] it will be hard for them to get 
standing” but that “Congress [could perhaps] sue as a body.” Tom Hamburger & Karen Tumulty, 
Congressional Democrats To File Emoluments Lawsuit Against Trump, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congressional-democrats-to-file-emoluments-lawsuit-
against-trump/2017/06/13/270e60e6-506d-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term=.7f 
138739eca9 (quoting Professor Grewal); cf. Grove & Devins, supra note 52, at 574, 603– 08 (arguing, 
in a different context, that congressional lawsuits generally require authorization from both chambers, 
except with respect to litigation concerning internal procedures of Senate or House). 
71.  To be sure, some legislative prerogatives can only be exercised by a particular 
institution—the Senate, for instance, or Congress as a whole. Legislative standing to assert such 
institutional prerogatives may well require participation of the relevant institution. See Hall, supra note 
52, at 26. But no such requirement has ever been held to exist for individual prerogatives, such as the 
right to cast an effective vote. Moreover, as Eric Segall has argued, recognizing legislative standing 
here poses no “floodgates” risk. It would not entail allowing Congress to sue whenever they believed 
the president was acting illegally.  
The claim that [Congress’s] consent is necessary because the text requires it is different than a 
generalized claim that the [p]resident is acting illegally by failing to properly implement a 
congressional law or even that the law he is executing is itself unconstitutional (the case in 
Raines). In both of those cases, Congress could hold votes to cure the alleged illegality. That 
remedy is simply not possible in the emoluments lawsuit. 
Segall, supra note 7.  
72.  Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. 
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legislators.73 In contrast, the injury alleged in Blumenthal v. Trump is an 
injury to individual legislators, not to Congress itself. As in Coleman and 
Arizona State Legislature, the injury alleged is the deprivation of the right 
to vote on a legislative matter and to have one’s vote counted. The power 
that is allegedly nullified is not the power to deny consent to any particular 
emolument; it is the opportunity to vote on the question at all, which is a 
right belonging to each individual member of Congress.74 The plaintiff 
members have been injured because their constitutionally-granted right to 
vote on emoluments prior to their acceptance has been “completely 
nullified.”75  
Even if the Court were inclined to hold that legislative standing 
requires plaintiffs to show that they have sufficient votes to achieve a 
particular outcome in the legislative process, an outright majority would 
not necessarily be required to assert a Foreign Emoluments Clause claim. 
Any one of the thirty senator plaintiffs could satisfy such a requirement 
here, due to the Senate’s rules and norms that give individual senators 
significant authority to prevent a bill from coming to a vote.76 Recall that 
congressional consent to an emolument requires passage of a bill or 
resolution by a majority vote of both chambers. In the Senate, 
longstanding tradition permits a single senator to issue a “hold” on 
legislation, which effectively prevents it from coming to a vote, and 
Senate rules permit any senator to filibuster any proposed legislation.77 
Thus, President Trump’s circumvention of Congress’s role in consenting 
to his receipt of foreign emoluments has nullified an individual 
prerogative belonging to each and every senator: the power to filibuster 
any bill or resolution that would grant such consent. 
In sum, the claims asserted in Blumenthal closely resemble those in 
Coleman and Arizona State Legislature in the most critical respect for 
establishing legislative standing: defendant’s conduct has deprived the 
individual plaintiffs of specific legislative prerogatives. The Court has 
                                                
73.  Id. at 826. 
74.  The D.C. Circuit has held that lawmakers alleging injury by deprivation of a vote need not 
show how that vote would have turned out in order to establish standing. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 
F.2d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“courts consistently vindicate the right to vote without first demanding 
that the votes when cast will achieve their intended end”), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 
(1979). Although the plaintiff in Arizona State Legislature was the legislature, the Court did not 
suggest that participation by the institution, rather than individual members, was necessary to establish 
legislative standing. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) 
75.  Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 (1939); see also Segall, supra note 7. 
76.  Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 339, 378– 79 (2015) (arguing that congressional standing should require participation of a 
sufficient number of members to exercise the power allegedly nullified). 
77.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
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never denied legislative standing in such a case.  
CONCLUSION 
Under a straightforward application of existing case law, plaintiffs’ 
allegations in each of the three pending emoluments cases likely suffice to 
establish standing at the motion to dismiss stage, with the exception of the 
Domestic Emoluments Clause claim in D.C. v. Trump. If the plaintiffs are 
able to support these allegations with evidence sufficient to survive the 
inevitable summary judgment motions, the courts will be able to address 
the important substantive questions raised by plaintiffs’ Emoluments 
Clause claims. 
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